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CASE COMMENTS
HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND THE REVLON PRINCIPLE: TRIGGERING
THE DUTY OF AUCTIONEER UNDER DELAWARE LAW
Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc.,
682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988)
In Black & Decker Corporation v. American Standard, Inc.,' the
United States District Court for Delaware expanded the reach of the
Revlon principle in takeover battles.2 The court recognized that a change
in control through recapitalization may, in some circumstances, be
equivalent to a "sale" of a corporation and thus trigger the directors'
duty to obtain the highest price for the shareholders' benefit. 3
In 1988, Black & Decker Corporation commenced a tender offer for
American Standard, Inc.'s outstanding stock at $56.00 per share.4 In
response, American Standard enacted several defensive measures, in-
cluding a poison pill,5 creation of a severance plan, amendments to its
employee retirement and savings plans and a recapitalization plan (the
"Plan"). 6
The Plan represented the keystone of the board's defensive tactics; it
provided that each public shareholder would receive $59.00 in cash and a
subordinated debenture with a face value of $10.80 in exchange for a
1. 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988).
2. Under Revlon, Inc v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986),
when the sale of a company becomes inevitable, "the directors' role change[s] from defenders of the
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of
the company." Id. at 182. For a discussion of Revlon, see infra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
3. 682 F. Supp. at 780-82. Other courts considering what constitutes a "sale" under Revlon
have focused primarily on whether an outside third party has purchased a majority of the company's
stock. Courts have also considered competitive bidding and the target board's intent as convincing
evidence of a sale. See infra notes 30, 34, 44-45, 62-63 and accompanying text.
4. 682 F. Supp. at 774.
5. On February 4, 1988, the American Standard board adopted a non-redeemable "poison
pill" or rights plan that provided shareholders of record with a dividend of one contingent "right"
for each share of stock. If any party acquired 15% or more of American Standard's common stock,
then each right entitled the holder to purchase five additional shares of common stock for $32.50 per
share. The rights of any party who crossed the 15% threshold were void. 682 F. Supp. at 774, 776.
6. The board decided that payments would be accelerated under the retirement and savings
plans and certain employees would receive severance pay "in the event of a potential change in
control" (the severance plan covered only salaried corporate staff). However, the board specifically
exempted the internal recapitalization plan from the definition of "changes in control." The total
cost of these benefits would be $130 million in the event of a change in control. Id. at 776.
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percentage of their ownership interest.7 The Plan also included an Em-
ployee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP") that would purchase $80 million
worth of stub equity.' In addition, management received the exclusive
right, through options exercisable at their own discretion, to exchange
each share of common stock owned for 11.7 shares of common stock in
the recapitalized company.9 If fully implemented, the Plan would reduce
the public's equity interest in American Standard from 92.6% to 45.5%
and give management and the ESOP trustee control over 55.5% of the
common stock.1°
Black & Decker sought a preliminary injunction with respect to the
Plan, the changes and additions to the employee benefits package, and
the "poison pill."'" Black & Decker argued that the Plan ensured Amer-
ican Standard management's control over a majority of the common
stock and thus involved a sale of control of the company. Black &
Decker further argued that a sale of control triggers the board's duty of
auctioneer under Revlon. 2 Finally, Black & Decker pointed to the active
bidding for American Standard as evidence that the target board recog-
nized the company would be sold. 3 The district court agreed and held
7. Id. at 782.
8. Id. at 782. "Stub equity" refers to the shareholders' remaining ownership interest in the
company after the recapitalization. Here only a fraction of their previous ownership interest exists.
Id.
9. Id. at 782-83.
10. Id. at 782.
11. Id. at 773, 778. American Standard's board agreed to terminate the poison pill if a majority
of the company's common stock was purchased via a formal tender offer. Black & Decker therefore
withdrew its request for relief from the poison pill, leaving the court to decide only the propriety of
the Plan, amendments to the employee benefits plans, and adoption of the severance plan. Id.
12. Id. at 778-79. Apparently, American Standard did not contest this purely legal issue, but
argued that management would not, in fact, gain control as a result of the Plan because the ESOP
would control 30% of the new common stock with "full, confidential, pass-through voting." Id. See
also supra note 2 (statement of Revlon's holding).
13. In arguing that a "sale" occured, Black & Decker emphasized that it increased the tender
offer three times and American Standard enhanced the value of the Plan twice. Id. at 779. Black &
Decker made its initial bid on January 27, 1988 at $56.00 per share. On February 5, 1988, Black &
Decker raised its offer to $65.00 per share. American Standard's board determined that the bid was
inadequate because a restructuring of the company could immediately exceed the $65.00 bid. The
Recapitalization Plan adopted by the board on February 18, 1988 provided an estimated value of
$70.00 to $72.00 a share. Not to be outdone, Black & Decker, on February 23, 1988, increased its
bid to $68.00. On March 3, 1988, American Standard responded and enhanced its Plan to reflect a
$74.00 value. Id. at 774-78.
American Standard retorted "that the Revlon doctrine [should] not apply because the Board ...
acted consistently to preserve the independence of the company and does not, in fact, intend to sell."
Id. at 779.
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that the Revlon duty to auction the corporation applied to American
Standard's board because adoption of a recapitalization plan that causes
a change in control amounts to a sale of the corporation,14 demonstrating
an intent to effectuate a sale of the corporation.' 5
Under Delaware law a board of directors has the ultimate broad power
to manage the business and affairs of a corporation. 6 Delaware courts
have the ability to check this power by holding directors liable for a
breach of their fiduciary duties, but under the guidance of the business
judgment rule, they exercise this check only sparingly. 7 The rule serves
as a rebuttable presumption that a board of directors makes business de-
cisions on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the best interests of the
company. 18 As a result, directors are protected from liability even if
their decisions, with the benefit of hindsight, were poor.' 9
14. Id. at 778. The court recognized three facts supportive of this argument: 1) American
Standard specifically exempted the Plan from the change in control definitions in the employee bene-
fits plans; 2) an American Standard news release explained that management and the ESOP would
control 55% of the company after recapitalization; and 3) Goldman Sachs, financial advisor for the
target company, likewise explained that management and the ESOP would own a controlling inter-
est. Id.
15. Id. at 784. In the second phase of the opinion, the court concluded that there was a
probability American Standard's board violated the Revlon principle by enacting the severance plan
and amending the retirement plans to the disadvantage of Black & Decker, without any commensu-
rate benefit to the shareholders. Id. at 786-87. This Note, however, focuses solely on the threshold
issue decided by the court: What facts and circumstances invoke the Revlon principle. See infra note
47-70 and accompanying text.
16. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a) (1983). See generally Note, Corporate Directors' Liability
for Resisting a Tender Offer: Proposed Substantive and Procedural Modifications of Existing State
Fiduciary Standards, 32 VAND. L. REv. 575, 589 (1979) (directors permitted to exercise substantial
discretion in daily business decisions without judicial interference at the request of dissatisfied
shareholders).
17. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting the importance of the
board's managerial freedom and refusing to invalidate a board's business decision absent an abuse of
discretion). But see Smith v. Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (finding the directors
liable for not making an informed decisions in approving a cash-out merger, thereby breaching their
duty of care to the stockholders).
The business judgment rule derives from the corporate directors' statutory responsibility for mak-
ing ultimate corporate decisions. Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984). The directors
have a fiduciary duty of care and duty of loyalty, owing to the company and its stockholders. Guth
v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
18. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (requiring the challenger to rebut the presumption that the
business decision was the product of an informed decision). See also Fischel, The Business Judg-
ment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437, 1443 (1985) (business judgment rule is
the embodiment of the court's presumption that directors are in a better position than judges to
make business decisions).
19, See white, Auctioning the Corporate Bastion: Delaware Readjusts the Business Judgment
Rule in Revlon, Inc v. MacA ndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 40 Sw. L.J. 1117, 1121 (1986) ("This
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Courts have redefined the business judgment rule, however, by limiting
the scope and application of the presumption when evaluating a board's
actions taken in response to a hostile takeover bid.20  The "enhanced
scrutiny ' 21 of a board's decisions evolved out of judicial concern that
directors implementing antitakeover devices may act on behalf of their
own interests and not those of their shareholders.22 The Revlon duty of
auctioneer reduces the risk of self-interest in battles for corporate
control.23
In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc.24 the Delaware
Supreme Court held that once it is inevitable that a company will be sold,
the directors owe a duty to the company's shareholders to serve as an
auctioneer.2 As an auctioneer, a board's duty is to maximize the com-
pany's sale price; therefore, defensive tactics must be designed to obtain
the highest price possible for the shareholder's stock.26 In Revlon, a take-
over bid within the range determined by Revlon to be adequate, coupled
with the Revlon board's authorization to negotiate a merger or sale to a
third party, indicated the inevitability of the company's sale.27
deference to professional judgment is no different from that accorded surgeons or other profession-
als. An operation may appear disastrous in hindsight, but judges do not infer a doctor's or director's
breach of duty from a bad result.") (footnotes omitted).
20. See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874; Pogostin, 480 A.2d at 627 (finding the business judgment
rule applicable in the context of a takeover); Smith, Recognition of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate
Directors and Officers Defending against Change of Control by Tender Offer, 7 Miss. L. REv. 117,
124-26 (1987) (discussing recent formulations of the rule).
21. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (When the board
responds to a takeover bid, "there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the
threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred."). See Smith, supra
note 20, at 124-26 (discussing "enhanced scrutiny").
22. Unocal, 492 A.2d at 954; see also Lamb & Turezyn, Revlon and Hanson Trust: Unlocking
the Lock-Ups, 12 DEL. J. CORP. L. 497, 501 (1987) ("If a board assumes such greater power by
adopting a rights plan or by otherwise acting to influence the result of a battle for corporate control
.. it must be prepared to meet the higher expectations the courts may imply.").
23. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 181-82 (Del. 1986).
24. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). In Revlon, Pantry Pride Inc. made an unsolicited cash tender
offer to the Revlon stockholders. In response, Revlon commenced an exchange offer for its own
shares and authorized management to negotiate with other interested companys for sale of the com-
pany. Id. at 182.
25. Id. at 182.
26. Once the sale became inevitable, the court opined, [t]he duty of the board.., changed
from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the com-
pany's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit. It no longer faced threats to corporate
policy and effectiveness, or to the stockholders' interests, from a grossly inadequate bid.
The whole question of defensive measures became moot.
Id.
27. Id. at 182. The Revlon board advised shareholders to reject the offer on the basis of its
[Vol. 67:273
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Two subsequent decisions have reaffirmed and expanded the Revlon
doctrine. In Edelman v. Fruehauf Corporation28 the Fruehauf board ap-
proved a two-tiered leveraged buyout by management as a defensive mea-
sure against the Edelman group's tender offer.29 Even though the
management proposal resulted in the acquisition of less than 100% of the
common stock, the Sixth Circuit found that the duty of auctioneer
applied.30
In Freedman v. Restaurant Associates Industries, Inc.31 a Restaurant
Associates management group proposed a "going private" transaction.32
After the management group publicly announced its offer, AWR Acquisi-
tions Corp., an entity controlled by a Restaurant Associates competitor,
answered with a merger proposal for the company. An active bidding
process ensued. 3 The court applied the Revlon doctrine to measure the
Restaurant Associates board's conduct, tacitly accepting AWR's conten-
tion that the sale became inevitable after the two parties announced their
respective bids.34 Freedman is significant because, unlike Revlon, the ini-
tial bid came from a group of insiders and both offers were contingent on
the approval of an independent committee of the Restaurant Associates
board.3 5
investment banker's opinion that the bid was grossly inadequate; the bankers estimated a sale of the
company as a "going concern" would bring a per share price in the "mid 50" dollar range. Id. at
177. After Pantry Pride's final bid, the Revlon board unanimously agreed to a leveraged buyout by a
"white knight." Id. at 178, 183.
28. 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986).
29. Id. at 884-85. Management proposed the formulation of a shell corporation to purchase
77% of the Fruehauf stock in a cash tender offer and a subsequent merger of the acquiring corpora-
tion and Fruehauf, exchanging the remaining Fruehauf shares for securities in the acquiring corpo-
ration. Id.
30. Id. at 886-87 ("All sides agree that Fruehauf is on the auction block."). In Revlon, the
board had approved a leveraged buyout by a third party for 100% of its stock, 506 A.2d 173, 178-79,
whereas in Edelman the target corporation's management would purchase 77% of the common
stock, followed by a merger. See supra note 29. Ostensibly, the Fruehauf court recognized that a
two-tiered acquisition is the functional equivalent of a sale of 100% of a corporation's stock.
31, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCHI) 93,502 (Del. Ch. 1987).
32. Id. at 97,216. The first step of the management-sponsored leveraged buy-out included a
cash offer for any and all shares of the company's stock at $18 per share. The second step in the
transaction proposed a merger in which the remaining public shareholders would have their shares
converted into a right to receive $18 in cash. Id. at 97,217.
33. Id. at 97,217-218. AWR arrived at a final proposal of $20 per share. Id. at 97,217.
34. The court characterized the situation as one in which, "it appears that the public sharehold-
ers are to be eliminated by one technique or another." Id. at 97,221.
35. In fact, the independent committee twice rejected the management group's offers. Id. at
97,217-218. The court concluded that Restaurant Associates' board did not violate its auctioneer
duty. Id. at 97,220.
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On the other hand, in Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corporation,36 the
Southern District Court of Ohio limited the scope of the Revlon doc-
trine.37 The court held that the target board's 38 authorization to man-
agement to explore a variety of defensive measures, including the possible
sale of the company, did not establish the board's duty of auctioneer.39
The court reasoned that this "open-door" policy could not be equated
with a board's definitive authorization to sell the company.' Further,
the court placed a significant amount of emphasis on the fact that the
board repeatedly maintained that it intended the company to remain a
"going concern."41
The Delaware Supreme Court had another opportunity to address the
Revlon doctrine in Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corporation.42
The Newmont board adopted a restructuring proposal and entered into a
standstill agreement with a third party in order to avoid Ivanhoe's hostile
takeover attempt.43 In holding that Revlon did not apply,44 the court
concluded that the board did not "sell" the corporation because the third
party purchased a minority share of the common stock from private sell-
ers and did not gain control of the corporation's board.45 In addition,
36. 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
37. Id. at 228.
38. The Buckhorn Corporation received an unsolicited tender offer from the Ropak Corpora-
tion. Id. at 215.
39. Id. The board actually adopted $750,000 in executive stock options and severance pay
plans which would vest immediately upon a change of control not approved by the board. Id. at
217. The board also authorized management to explore other alternatives including:
a) a public or private sale of Buckhorn securities; b) a self-tender; c) a sale of a significant
portion of Buckhorn; d) a spin-off of certain assets; e) a business combination or joint
venture between Buckhorn and one or more companies; and f) acquisition by Buckhorn of
all or part of the business of any other company.
Id. at 218.
40. Id. at 228. Specifically, the court stated, "Thus, unlike the facts of Revlon, Buckhorn's
directors did not inevitably commit themselves to selling any part or all of Buckhorn." Id.
41. Id.
42. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
43. In response to Ivanhoe's tender offer, Newmont declared a $33 per share dividend to all its
stockholders. This dividend provided Gold Fields, Newmont's largest shareholder, with the impetus
to engage in a street sweep which increased its ownership in Newmont from 26% to 49.7%,
Newmont also amended a standstill agreement with Gold Fields which ensured that its interest in
Newmont would not exceed 49.9% and that its representation on Newmont's board would be lim-
ited to 40%. Id. at 1339-340.
44. The record did not convince the court that the sale of Newmont was "inevitable." Id. at
1345.
45. Id. The Newmont court also concluded that a bidding contest had not taken place. "The
only bidder for Newmont was Ivanhoe. Gold Fields was not a bidder, but wished only to protect its
already substantial interest in the company. It did so through the street sweep." Id.
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the court noted that the Newmont board never swayed from its decision
to keep the company independent.46
In Black & Decker Corporation v. American Standard, Inc.,' the
United States District Court for Delaware adopted the broad interpreta-
tion of Revlon suggested by the earliest decisions on this issue.48 The
court, initially acknowledged that Delaware law does not impose the
duty of auctioneer on a board until the sale of the corporation is inevita-
ble.49 In this case, the court framed the initial question as "whether a
transaction which results in a change in control ... amounts to a 'sale'
under Revlon, Inc."5" First, the court concluded that exempting "sale of
control" transactions from Revlon would immunize directors from the
duty of auctioneer when faced with a two-tiered tender offer. This result
would undermine the shareholders' interest in profit maximization."
Second, the court espoused the analysis utilized in Edelman v. Frue-
hauf Corporation. 52 The Sixth Circuit recognized that the duties out-
lined in Revlon apply not only in cases where all shares of the company
have been sold but also where a simple majority of the shares are
purchased.53 Edelman involved a two-tiered, management-led leveraged
buyout. 4 The Black & Decker court's conclusion to apply Revlon was
guided by Edelman, which the court viewed as virtually indistinguishable
from the facts of the case before it.55
Finally, the court acknowledged that the Delaware Supreme Court, in
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corporation,56 strictly construed
46, Id.
47. 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988).
48, See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
49. 682 F. Supp. at 780.
50. Id. at 780-81. Labelling the case as one of first impression, the federal court found it must
determine what course the Delaware Supreme Court would take if confronted with the same facts
and circumstances. Id. at 781 n.3.
51. Id. at 781 (quoting Freedman v. Restaurant Associates, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 93,502, at 97,219 (Del. Ch. 1987)). "In a two-tiered tender offer, the raider makes a
cash tender offer for a controlling interest in the target and, upon obtaining control, merges the
target into itself at a lower second-tier price." 682 F. Supp. at 781 n.5 (citing Lipton, Corporate
Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 18 (1987).
52. 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986). See supra notes 28-30 and accompany text.
53. Black & Decker, 682 F. Supp. at 781.
54. See supra note 28.
55. 682 F. Supp. at 781 n.6. Ultimately, each target board in Edelman and Black & Decker
would acquire control of the company and the shareholders would retain a fractional equity interest.
Id.
56. 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987). See supra notes 42-46.
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Revlon, but emphasized that the distinctions inherent in Ivanhoe permit-
ted the conclusion that a sale was inevitable in the instant case.5 7 First,
in Ivanhoe, Gold Fields purchased its stock form private sellers, not the
company. 8 Second, by agreement of the parties, Gold Fields was pro-
hibited from gaining majority control. 9 Here, by contrast, the American
Standard board initiated the sale of stock and retained options for itself
enabling it to acquire majority control from the shareholders. 6° Thus,
unlike the Newmont board that manifested its intent in the "standstill"
agreement to keep the company independent, the American Standard
board made a change in control inevitable.61
This combination of factors led the Black & Decker court to conclude
that "a sale of control of a corporation could amount to a 'sale' under
Revlon, Inc."62 In addition, the court agreed with Black & Decker's con-
tention that American Standard's enhanced recapitalization in response
to each increased offer by Black & Decker constituted active bidding for
control of the company. 63 The court found the objective accounts by
observers of this takeover contest more than sufficient to rebut American
Standard's contention that no bidding contest had ensued.64 This elabo-
rate analysis led the court to conclude that "approval of the Recapitaliza-
tion Plan 'was a recognition that the company was for sale.' "65
The Black & Decker court, in examining the board's actions, adopted
the same criteria implemented in the previous decisions.66 The court cor-
rectly held that the change in control of a majority of American Standard
57. 682 F. Supp. at 781-82.
58. See supra note 43.
59. Id.
60. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
61. 682 F. Supp. at 783-84.
62. Id. at 782. The court therefore focused its attention on the Plan as adopted by the Ameri-
can Standard board. In response to American Standard's argument that the shareholders would
control 55% of the stock immediately after the Plan's adoption, the court emphasized that manage-
ment could unilaterally take control via the stock options. ("Merely stopping at [559o] ... does not
do justice to the situation faced by American Standard's shareholders. To ignore the presence of the
stock options would result in overlooking the complete offer to the public shareholders."). Id. The
court concluded that "the transfer of control occurs now, while the relegation to minority status
occurs sometime in the future under the exclusive control of management." Id. at 783.
63. Id. at 784.
64. Id. The court noted that the Wall Street Journal printed accounts of the transactions be-
tween the parties. Thus, the court stated, the public must have perceived that American Standard
was for sale. Id.
65. Id. (quoting Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182).
66. See supra notes 24-46 and accompanying text.
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stock to the board represented the sale of the company under Revlon.
Although the court did not stress the rationale behind the Revlon doc-
trine, the court's conclusion is consistent with protecting shareholders
from directors who may take advantage of a takeover threat by increas-
ing their ownership interest in the company.6 7
More importantly, the holding further defines which acts suffice to
place a company on the auction block.68 The Black & Decker court's
focus on whether a company has undergone a change in control alleviates
much of a board's difficulty in determining when its role transforms from
defending to selling the corporation.
Revlon could be further refined, however, if subsequent courts focused
on how a board's decision in a takeover contest affects the shareholders'
equity position. The Black & Decker court's analysis and application of
Revlon appear to allow management, faced with a hostile takeover, to
preserve the company at any cost short of management obtaining a ma-
jority of the stock.6 9 If, for example, the facts of the Black & Decker case
existed but management could only achieve a forty-nine percent owner-
ship of American Standard, the court would be less likely to impose the
duty of auctioneer. This is so because management would not obtain
control.70 The result of the Black & Decker formulation is that the
shareholders would be unable to consider competing offers. Further, the
shareholders' equity position would decrease substantially.71 However, if
a court recognizes that a defensive tactic that substantially reduces share-
holders' equity position triggers the auctioneering duty, then stockhold-
ers would be guaranteed the maximum sale price for their stock.
M.R.B.
67. See supra notes 22, 23 and accompanying text.
68. See supra notes 52-65 and accompanying text.
69. 682 F. Supp. at 782-85. The Court determined the Plan was a sale of the corporation
because management would acquire 55% of the stock. Id.
70. In Black & Decker, management's ability to achieve a majority interest through stock op-
tions caused the court to rule that the Plan was a sale of the corporation. 683 F. Supp. at 782-85.
71. For example, under the facts of Black & Decker, the shares were worth between $70 and
$71. Under the Plan, the shareholders retained equity would be only $6 to $8. Id. at 782.
1989]
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